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ack Landau was the best appellate court judge in Oregon history, 
with the sole exception of Hans Linde. His opinions for the Oregon 
Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court are lucidly written, 
flawlessly organized, thoroughly researched, courageously 
independent, and ideologically unbiased. Two examples demonstrate 
these characteristics, as well as his willingness to confront difficult 
issues of first impression under the Oregon Constitution: Tanner v. 
Oregon Health Sciences University,1 a 1998 court of appeals opinion, 
and Couey v. Atkins,2 from the supreme court in 2015. 
In Tanner, two lesbian state employees challenged the employer’s 
policy of denying health and life insurance benefits to same-sex 
couples. After concluding that the policy did not violate Oregon’s 
antidiscrimination statute,3 the Court addressed the more consequential 
and difficult issue: Did the discrimination against homosexual couples 
violate Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution’s equal 
treatment guarantee?4 At that time, as then Judge Landau explained, 
the Oregon courts’ interpretation of section 20 was “something of a 
work in progress.”5 What followed was an orderly analysis 
harmonizing a long history of apparently contradictory case law and 
drawing an easily followed template for applying that provision in 
future cases—without reference to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. It bears emphasis that this decision 
* Senior Judge, Oregon Court of Appeals, and Professor of Practice, University of
Oregon Law School. 
1 157 Or. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998). 
2 357 Or. 460, 355 P.3d 866 (2015). 
3 OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(b) (2017).  
4 “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or 
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 20. 
5 Tanner, 157 Or. App. at 520, 971 P.2d at 445. 
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occurred long before the legal battles against antihomosexual 
legislation had been joined by many other courts and well ahead of 
popular sentiment on that topic. It was, in other words, prescient, 
independent, and brave. Beyond the immediate context of gay rights, 
the opinion’s analysis also concluded that Oregon’s equality guarantee, 
unlike the Equal Protection Clause, applies to government action that 
has an unlawfully discriminatory effect, even if that effect is incidental 
to a nondiscriminatory intention.6 Tanner was not appealed to the 
supreme court; it remains the most definitive interpretation of Article 
I, section 20. 
Couey v. Atkins involved a challenge to a statute prohibiting persons 
from gathering initiative petition signatures for pay if the person was 
also an unpaid signature gatherer on another measure.7 When Couey 
initiated the challenge, he fell within the statute’s prohibition, but by 
the time the case reached the trial court, he was no longer collecting 
signatures for pay. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that 
it was moot and did not qualify for the statutory mootness exception 
for cases that are “capable of repetition . . . [yet] likely to evade judicial 
review.”8 Ducking the issue, the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding 
the case was moot, but also that it was not, in fact, likely to evade 
review. The court noted that, had it concluded that the case did qualify 
for the “evading review” statutory exception, it would have raised the 
obvious question whether the statute was constitutional—in other 
words, whether the Oregon Constitution, like its federal counterpart, 
contained a “case or controversy” requirement.9 
In his opinion for the Oregon Supreme Court, now Justice Landau 
ventured where the court of appeals feared to tread. He agreed that 
Couey’s case was moot, but parted ways with the courts below by also 
concluding that the case was, indeed, capable of repetition yet evading 
review. Having convincingly argued that the case could not be resolved 
on subconstitutional grounds, he squarely confronted the constitutional 
issue: Did the statutory authorization of some moot cases contravene a 
“case or controversy” requirement in the Oregon Constitution? Like the 
6 Id. at 524–25, 971 P.2d at 447 (“According to OHSU, the fact that such a facially 
neutral classification has the unintended side effect of discriminating against homosexual 
couples who cannot marry is not actionable under Article I, section 20. We are not persuaded 
by the asserted defense. Article I, section 20, does not prohibit only intentional 
discrimination. . . . OHSU’s intentions in this case are not relevant.”). 
7 OR. REV. STAT. § 250.048(9) (2017). 
8 OR. REV. STAT. § 14.175 (2017). 
9 Couey v. Brown, 257 Or. App. 434, 445 n.1, 306 P.3d 778, 784 n.1 (2013), rev’d sub 
nom. Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or. 460, 355 P.3d 866 (2015). 
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supreme court’s Article I, section 20, case law, the court’s prior 
jurisprudence regarding justiciability was in complete disarray. One 
case, Kellas v. Department of Corrections, held in no uncertain terms 
that “[t]he Oregon Constitution contains no ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’ 
provision.”10 An earlier case, Yancy v. Shatzer, pointed with equal 
vigor in the opposite direction: “The judicial power under the Oregon 
Constitution does not extend to moot cases that are ‘capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.’”11 
Justice Landau’s opinion on this issue began with a clarification of 
the court’s theory of stare decisis, explaining that, while it precludes 
the court from reversing an earlier decision “merely because the court’s 
current members may hold a different view than its predecessors,” 
nonetheless “the value of stability that is served by adhering to 
precedent may be outweighed by the need to correct past errors.”12 
Rather than simply announcing that one of the earlier cases, Yancy or 
Kellas, was a “past error,” and in recognition of the importance of 
carefully justifying overruling precedent, Justice Landau conducted a 
detailed and thorough review of the Oregon Constitution’s text, the 
historical context surrounding its adoption, the common law 
background (citing Coke),13 nineteenth-century Oregon and other state 
cases, federal treatment of the issue, and numerous law review articles 
and scholarly treatises. He ultimately concluded that, unlike the United 
States Constitution as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Oregon Constitution had no per se “justiciability” requirement. He was 
careful, however, to limit the scope of the opinion to the facts presented 
by the case: 
[T]here is no basis for concluding that the court lacks judicial power
to hear public actions or cases that involve matters of public interest
that might otherwise have been considered nonjusticiable under prior
case law. Whether that analysis means that the state constitution
imposes no such justiciability limitations on the exercise of judicial
power in other cases, we leave for another day.
We also do not hold that moot cases will no longer be subject to 
dismissal. We hold only that Article VII (Amended), section 1, does 
not require dismissal in public actions or cases involving matters of 
public interest.14 
10 341 Or. 471, 478, 145 P.3d 139, 143 (2006). 
11 337 Or. 345, 363, 97 P.3d 1161, 1176 (2004), abrogated by Couey, 357 Or. 460, 355 
P.3d 866 (2015).
12 Couey, 357 Or. at 485, 355 P.3d at 881.
13 Id. at 495, 355 P.3d at 887.
14 Id. at 520, 355 P.3d at 901.
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Couey, then, perfectly demonstrates Justice Landau’s jurisprudence: 
articulate, thorough, thoughtful, careful, and respectful of precedent 
without letting it perpetuate error. No judge in Oregon history (with, 
again, the exception of Hans Linde) would have been capable of such 
work.  
What makes the quality of Jack Landau’s opinions even more 
remarkable is their quantity. In his eighteen years on the Court of 
Appeals, he authored over 1000 majority opinions––an astonishing 
average of more than one per week,  far more than any of his colleagues. 
He did this while also serving as a Presiding Judge of one of the court’s 
three-judge panels, a position requiring a significant amount of 
administrative work. Further, no opinion issues from the court of 
appeals without having been subjected to the editorial and substantive 
scrutiny of all the court’s judges. The same is true of the supreme court. 
Although I was never privy to the inner workings of the supreme court, 
I can testify from personal knowledge that Judge Landau’s contribution 
to the many thousands of opinions that issued from the court of appeals 
during his tenure benefited incalculably from his comments, critiques, 
and encouragement, always delivered with tact and, frequently, with 
humor. 
By the time I arrived at the court, Jack was a veteran and an 
acknowledged leader by virtue of his intelligence and experience. Like 
other new judges, as well as his (and other judges’) clerks and staff 
attorneys, I benefitted from his kindness, patience, and mentorship. 
And, in what I regard as an acid test of a judge’s collegiality, he was 
beloved by his judicial staff. 
All of Jack’s judicial accomplishments occurred while, in his 
“leisure” time, he also authored an impressive collection of law review 
articles, acquired a Master of Laws degree from the University of 
Virginia, taught courses in legislation at all of Oregon’s law schools, 
played classical guitar, participated in a long-standing regular poker 
game, raised a family, and became an accomplished chef specializing 
in Italian cuisine. He has been not only an invaluable part of Oregon’s 
legal culture but a true renaissance man. The Court will suffer in his 
absence, but his contributions to that culture, as well as to his family, 
his friends, his many former clerks, his former students, and his many 
admirers will live on. 
